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Abstract
A secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic protocol by means of which a dealer shares a secret among a set of participants in
such a way that it can be subsequently reconstructed by certain qualiﬁed subsets. The setting we consider is the following: in a ﬁrst
phase, the dealer gives in a secure way a piece of information, called a share, to each participant. Then, participants belonging to a
qualiﬁed subset send in a secure way their shares to a trusted party, referred to as a combiner, who computes the secret and sends it
back to the participants.
Cheating-immune secret sharing schemes are secret sharing schemes in the above setting where dishonest participants, during
the reconstruction phase, have no advantage in sending incorrect shares to the combiner (i.e., cheating) as compared to honest
participants. More precisely, a coalition of dishonest participants, by using their correct shares and the incorrect secret supplied by
the combiner, have no better chance in determining the true secret (that would have been reconstructed if they submitted correct
shares) than an honest participant.
In this paper we study properties and constraints of cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. We show that a perfect secret
sharing scheme cannot be cheating-immune. Then, we prove an upper bound on the number of cheaters tolerated in such schemes.
We also repair a previously proposed construction to realize cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. Finally, we discuss some
open problems.
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1. Introduction
Secret sharing schemes are a fundamental primitive in cryptography. They were introduced in 1979 by Blakley [2]
and Shamir [13]. The reader can ﬁnd an introduction and references to the literature in [14].
In its basic form, a secret sharing scheme is a protocol divided into two phases: Share and Reconstruct. During Share,
a dealer distributes a secret among a set of participants by sending in a secure way a piece of information to each of
them, called a share. Then, during Reconstruct, some subsets of participants (called qualiﬁed subsets) can reconstruct
the secret either by pooling together their shares, or by sending their shares in a secure way to a trusted party (called
a combiner) who collects the shares, reconstructs the secret, and sends it back to these participants.3 Other subsets
(called forbidden subsets), even by pooling together and processing their shares, do not learn any information about
the secret. In such a model, the dealer and participants are assumed to be honest.
However, many applications have to deal with the case of dishonest participants and (possibly) a dishonest dealer.
Tompa and Woll in [16] showed that Shamir’s threshold scheme can be subject to the following attack (which can be
applied to all linear secret sharing schemes). A dishonest participant, during Reconstruct, can submit to the combiner
an opportunely constructed fake share. Hence, the reconstructed secret is different from the original one. But, from this
secret, the dishonest participant (and only he) can recover the original secret.
For example, consider the simple secret sharing scheme where the secret K is the modulo-q sum of three shares:
K = s1 + s2 + s3 mod q. If the ﬁrst participant submits an incorrect share, say s′1 = s1, then the combiner outputs the
value K ′ = s′1 + s2 + s3 mod q. Given K ′, the ﬁrst participant can compute the correct secret K =K ′ + s1 − s′1 mod q.
The second and third participants may not even know that the value K ′ is incorrect. In any event, they cannot compute
K even if they do know that K ′ is incorrect.
Tompa and Woll showed in [16] how to modify Shamir’s scheme to avoid such an attack. Other papers which deal
with the model analysed by Tompa and Woll include [4,5].
In order to design secret sharing schemes that keep working even in hostile environments, the concept of veriﬁability
was introduced in [7]. With this more general approach, some extra information is used to enable participants to detect
a dishonest dealer, who sends inconsistent shares during Share, and to verify during Reconstruct that each participant
submits a correct share. A lot of research has been done for both unconditionally secure and computationally secure
veriﬁable secret sharing schemes (see [1,6,9,15,12], to name a few papers).Veriﬁable secret sharing schemes have been
widely used in multi-party computation and in other applications of secret sharing schemes.
However, the world of applications is quite varied and veriﬁable secret sharing schemes are not always necessary.
Moreover, the computation, communication, and round complexities of veriﬁable secret sharing schemes are con-
siderably greater than in the basic model for secret sharing. Therefore, achieving some forms of limited protection
against cheaters in the basic model remains an interesting research problem. Along this line, a different approach to
deal with cheating in secret sharing schemes was suggested by Pieprzyk and Zhang in [17,10,11]. In the model therein
considered, called cheating-immune secret sharing, the dealer and combiner are assumed to be honest. Participants
can cheat, during Reconstruct, by submitting incorrect shares to the combiner. Such a secret sharing scheme is said to
be cheating-immune if cheaters, on submitting incorrect shares, have no advantage (as compared to honest users) in
determining the true secret. Notice that the combiner will only hear from some qualiﬁed subset of participants, and
some bounded number of these may be cheaters.
It is perhaps useful to point out that, despite some superﬁcial resemblances, cheating-immune and veriﬁable secret
sharing schemes are solving two different problems. A veriﬁable secret sharing scheme is one that tolerates incorrect
shares, allowing the correct secret to be reconstructed even when certain shares are faulty, via a process of detection
and/or correction of the faulty shares. A cheating-immune secret sharing scheme will not compute the correct secret
if a submitted share is faulty. The objective is rather to prevent cheaters from being able to compute the secret when
honest participants cannot do so.
Organization of the paper: In Section 2, we give some background on secret sharing schemes: we recall the concepts
of perfect and ideal secret sharing schemes. In Section 3, we describe a model for cheating-immune secret sharing
scheme, which is the same given in [10], and in Section 4 we recall a characterization for such schemes; while, in
Section 5, we point out a relation with resilient functions, which enables us to prove an upper bound on the number
3 In this paper we deal only with the latter reconstruction mode.
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of possible cheaters in any (n, n) threshold scheme. In Section 6, we repair a previously proposed construction for
cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. Finally, in Section 7, we state some results for the case of ramp schemes.
2. Perfect secret sharing scheme
In this section we brieﬂy recall the deﬁnition and some properties of perfect secret sharing schemes.
Let P be a set of participants and let S be a set of possible secrets. The collection of subsets A ⊆ 2P, qualiﬁed
to reconstruct the secret, is usually referred to as the access structure of the secret sharing scheme. Denoting by S a
random variable representing the choice of a secret in S, by A the shares received by a subset of participants A ∈ A,
and using the entropy function,4 we can state the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. A perfect secret sharing scheme  with secrets chosen in S, for the access structure A ⊆ 2P, is a
protocol consisting of a Share phase and a Reconstruct phase, satisfying two conditions:
1. Every qualiﬁed subset of participants can compute the secret:
formally, for all A ∈A, it holds that H(S|A) = 0.
2. Any forbidden subset of participants gets absolutely no information on the secret value:
formally, for all A /∈A, it holds that H(S|A) = H(S).
Property 1 means that the value of the shares held by A ∈ A uniquely determines the secret s ∈ S. On the other
hand, Property 2 means that the probability that the secret is equal to s given that the shares held by A /∈A are a, is the
same as the a priori probability of the secret s. In other words, by pooling together their shares, a forbidden subset of
participant gets absolutely no information about the secret. If Property 2 is not satisﬁed, i.e., H(S|A)<H(S), then a
secret sharing scheme  is said to be not perfect.
A secret sharing scheme  can be represented by a matrix M, where each row corresponds to a possible distribution
of shares for a certain secret. More precisely, in this representation, the ﬁrst column of M is indexed by the dealer D,
and contains the possible secret values he may wish to share, and the remaining columns are indexed by the participants
in P, and represent the shares they can get for each secret. This model has been proposed in [14].
The efﬁciency of a secret sharing scheme is measured by means of an information rate, which relates the size of the
secret to the size of the shares given to the participants. More precisely, given a secret sharing scheme  for the access
structureA, on the set of secrets S, and denoting by K(P ) the set of possible shares for participant P, we deﬁne the
information rate (,A, S) as
(,A, S) = log |S|
max
P∈P
log |K(P )|
and the optimal information rate ofA as
(A) = sup (,A, S),
where the sup is taken over the space of all possible sets of secrets S, such that |S|2, and all secret sharing schemes
 for A. Secret sharing schemes with information rate equal to one, which is the maximum possible value of this
parameter (i.e., the secret and the shares have the same size), are called ideal.
3. Cheating-immune model
We consider ideal secret sharing schemes with shares and values in GF(pt ). More precisely, we start by considering
(n, n) secret sharing schemes ((n, n)-SSS, for short), i.e., schemes where all shares held by n participants are required
to reconstruct the secret. The model and the notation are the same as in [10].
4 The reader is referred to Appendix A for the deﬁnition of the entropy function and some basic properties.
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Let GF(pt ) denote a ﬁnite ﬁeld with pt elements, where p is a prime number and t is a positive integer. Let GF(pt )n
be the vector space of n-tuples of elements from GF(pt ). For each = (1, . . . , n) ∈ GF(pt )n, we denote by HW()
(Hamming Weight) the number of non-zero coordinates of .
In our setting, a vector  ∈ GF(P t )n represents the shares the participants get from the dealer during Share. The
secret sharing scheme  is represented by a deﬁning function,
f :GF(pt )n → GF(pt ),
which associates to each n-tuple of shares a secret value in GF(pt ).
Cheaters are represented by a vector  ∈ GF(pt )n, called cheating vector: non-zero elements represent the change
of the true shares performed by the cheaters. The number of cheaters is equal to the Hamming weight of . Moreover,
given two vectors, x and , we denote by x+ ∈ GF(pt )n a vector such that x+j = xj if j = 0, and x+j = 0 otherwise.
Conversely, we denote by x− ∈ GF(pt )n a vector such that x−j =xj if j =0, and x−j =0 otherwise. Finally, given two
vectors  and , we say that  if j = 0 implies j = 0. Using the above notation we further deﬁne the following
sets:
R(, + ,K) = {x− |f (x− + + ) = K}
and
R(, + + ,K∗) = {x− |f (x− + + + ) = K∗},
where K = f () and K∗ = f ( + ).
The ﬁrst set represents the possible shares held by honest participants, enabling the reconstruction of the true secret
K, if cheaters behaved honestly. The second one represents the possible shares held by honest participants enabling the
reconstruction of K∗, when the cheaters submit incorrect shares. Therefore, the value
, = |R(, + + ,K∗) ∩ R(, + ,K)|/|R(, + + ,K∗)|
is the probability of successful cheating with respect to  and .
Deﬁnition 2 (Pieprzyk and Zhang [10]). An (n, n)-SSS with shares and values in GF(pt ) is said to be k-cheating-
immune if, for every  ∈ GF(pt )n and any  ∈ GF(pt )n, with 1HW()k, it holds that , = p−t .
A 1-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme will be simply referred to as a cheating-immune secret sharing scheme.
Notice that the above deﬁnition assumes that all the cheaters submit fake shares. When k > 1, a more general deﬁnition
takes into account the possibility that some subset of the cheaters submit correct shares. The underlying idea that
justiﬁes such an extension of the model is that there could be a strategy by means of which a coalition of cheaters
can gain more information if only some of them submit incorrect shares. More precisely, we use a binary vector  to
identify the cheaters and a vector  ∈ GF(pt )n to specify how much they cheat and, for every , we deﬁne
,, = |R(, + + ,K∗) ∩ R(, + ,K)|/|R(, + + ,K∗)|
to be the probability of successful cheating with respect to , , and .
Deﬁnition 3 (Pieprzyk and Zhang [10]). An (n, n)-SSS with shares and values in GF(pt ) is said to be strictly k-
cheating-immune if, for every  ∈ GF(pt )n, any vector  ∈ GF(2)n, and any  ∈ GF(pt )n, such that ,
1HW()HW()k, it holds that ,, = p−t .
4. Characterization for k-cheating-immune secret sharing
In this section we show some results about cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. We start by proving that a
perfect secret sharing scheme cannot be cheating-immune. More precisely, we can state the following:
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Theorem 4. Let  be an (n, n)-secret sharing scheme with shares and values in GF(pt ). If  is perfect, then  cannot
be cheating-immune.
Proof. For simplicity, assume the set of shares and secrets is GF(2). In this case, the deﬁning function, f, is given by
f :GF(2)n → GF(2).
Moreover, assume that 0 and 1, the values the secret can assume, are uniformly distributed. For any subset of participants
A = {i1, . . . , in−1}, Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 1, implies that 0 and 1 still have the same a priori probabilities, once the
users in A pool together their shares. From the point of view of user in, this means that his share determines the value
of the function. In other words, assuming that the share he gets from the dealer is 0, if during the reconstruction phase
he submits 1, and the reconstructed secret is b, then he knows that the real secret is 1− b. Hence, the cheating-immune
property is not satisﬁed since , = 12 with respect to any  and = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . 0), with a single one in position
in. A similar argument can be used for the case in which the set of shares and secrets is GF(pt ). 
Notice that, if Deﬁnition 2 is extended to the case of general (ideal) access structures A, deﬁned over the set of
participants P, the above result still holds. Indeed, the key point in the above proof is that Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 1
rules out, from the point of view of participant in, one possible secret; hence, , = 1/pt .
A cheating-immune secret sharing scheme will satisfy Property 1 of Deﬁnition 1, namely, a qualiﬁed subset of shares
will determine the value of the secret. Therefore it follows from Theorem 4 that Property 2 cannot be satisﬁed. Hence,
in a cheating-immune secret sharing scheme, some forbidden subsets of participants will, in some circumstances, be
able to determine some (partial) information about the secret by pooling their shares.
The structure of the deﬁning function f of a cheating-immune secret sharing scheme can be precisely characterized.
The following result was shown in [10]. We recall this characterization by giving a slightly simpliﬁed proof, compared
to the one given in [10].
Theorem 5. Let  be an (n, n)-SSS with shares and values in GF(pt ). Then,  is k-cheating-immune ⇔ for any
integer , where 1k, for any  ∈ GF(pt )n, such that HW() = , for any , and for any u, v ∈ GF(pt ), the
following conditions hold simultaneously:
(i) |R(, , v)| = pt(n−−1),
(ii) |(R(, , v) ∩ R(,  + , u))| = pt(n−−2).
Proof. The ﬁrst implication is immediate: indeed, if (i) and (ii) hold, then the scheme is k-cheating immune. Hence,
given a k-cheating immune secret sharing scheme, we have to show that (i) and (ii) hold. Let HW() = . For any
,  ∈ GF(pt )n, the family of subsets {R(, + +,K∗)}K∗∈GF(pt ) is a partition of the set {x− | ∈ GF(pt )n and x− ∈
GF(pt )n} ⊆ GF(pt )n. Since |{x− | ∈ GF(pt )n and x− ∈ GF(pt )n}| = pt(n−), we have that∑
K∗∈GF(pt )
|R(, + + ,K∗)| = pt(n−). (1)
From the deﬁnition of a k-cheating immune secret sharing scheme, we also have
|R(, + + ,K∗) ∩ R(, + ,K)| =
1
pt
|R(, + + ,K∗)|. (2)
On the other hand, we can partition R(, + ,K) as follows:
R(, + ,K) =
⋃
K∗∈GF(pt )
{R(, + + ,K∗) ∩ R(, + ,K)}.
Therefore,
|R(, + ,K)| =
∑
K∗∈GF(pt )
|R(, + + ,K∗) ∩ R(, + ,K)|. (3)
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Then, substituting Eq. (2) in Eq. (3), we get
|R(, + ,K)| =
∑
K∗∈GF(pt )
1
pt
|R(, + + ,K∗)|,
and, by using Eq. (1),
|R(, + ,K)| =
1
pt
∑
K∗∈GF(pt )
|R(, + + ,K∗)| = pt(n−−1). (4)
Thus, property (i) is satisﬁed. At this point notice that, since (4) holds for every pair (, + ), using an appropriate ,
we can always write + = + + . Therefore, we can replace + in R(, + ,K) in Eq. (4) with + + . Hence
|R(, + + ,K)| = pt(n−−1),
and, by using Eq. (2), we get
|R(, + + ,K∗) ∩ R(, + ,K)| =
1
pt
· pt(n−−1) = pt(n−−2).
Therefore, the result holds. 
5. k-cheating-immunity and k-resilience
In this section we investigate the relation between k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme over GF(pt ) and
resilient functions. Such a relation has already been pointed out for the binary case (k-cheating-immune secret sharing
scheme over GF(2)) in [11,17]. We use it to state an upper bound on the number of possible cheaters tolerated in a
cheating-immune secret sharing scheme.
Deﬁnition 6. A function f :GF(pt )n → GF(pt ) is said to be balanced if, for each K ∈ GF(pt ), it holds that
|{x ∈ GF(pt )n|f (x) = K}| = pt(n−1).
In other words, each value f (x) ∈ GF(pt ) has the same number of pre-images x.
Deﬁnition 7. A function f :GF(pt )n → GF(pt ) is said to be k-resilient if, for every subset {j1, . . . , jk} ⊂ {1, . . . , n}
and every (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ GF(pt )k , the function
f (x1, . . . , xn)|xj1=a1,...,xjk=ak
is balanced over GF(pt )n−k .
Notice that, if f :GF(pt )n → GF(pt ) is the deﬁning function of a perfect (n, n)-SSS where the secrets are
chosen uniformly at random, then, for any 1k <n, f is k-resilient. This property easily follows from Condition 2 of
Deﬁnition 1.
The next corollary, concerning k-cheating-immune secret sharing schemes, easily follows from Theorem 5.
Corollary 8. Let  be an (n, n)-SSS, and let f :GF(pt )n → GF(pt ) be the deﬁning function of . If  is k-cheating-
immune, then f is k-resilient.
On the other hand, we can prove the following result:
Theorem 9. Let  be an (n, n)-SSS, and let f :GF(pt )n → GF(pt ) be the deﬁning function of . If  is k-cheating-
immune, then f cannot be (n − k)-resilient.
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Proof. We need some notation and preliminary results.
• Let 1sk. For any subset of indices ={j1, . . . , js} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let ={i1, . . . , in−s}={1, . . . , n}\{j1, . . . , js}
be the complementary subset. For any vector x ∈ GF(pt )n, let
u = (xj1 , . . . , xjs ) and v = (xi1 , . . . , xin−s ).
Then, we can write f (x) = f (u, v). Moreover, let  = (j1 , . . . , js ) ∈ GF(pt )s . This vector represents shares
held by cheaters. If u and  have no common coordinates, that is, ji = xji for every 1 is, we say that they
are totally distinct, and we write u /
 .
• If  is k-cheating immune, Theorem 5 implies that, for any K ∈ GF(pt ) and any  ∈ GF(pt )s ,
|{v ∈ GF(pt )n−s |f (, v) = K}| = pt(n−s−1).
Let us ﬁx K ∈ GF(pt ) and  ∈ GF(pt )s , and denote by
RK, = {v ∈ GF(pt )n−s |f (, v) = K}.
Then, |RK,| = pt(n−s−1), and applying again Theorem 5, for any K∗ ∈ GF(pt ) and any u ∈ GF(pt )s , such
that u /
 , we have that
|{v ∈ RK,|f (u, v) = K∗}| = |RK, ∩ {v ∈ GF(pt )n−s |f (u, v) = K∗}|
= pt(n−s−2).
The above relation holds even for K = K∗.
• Let
QK, = {(u, v)|u ∈ GF(pt )s, u /
 , v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}.
It easily follows that
|QK,| =
∑
u∈GF(pt )s ,u /

|{v ∈ RK,|f (u, v) = K}|
= (pt − 1)spt(n−s−2). (5)
Eq. (5) holds for 1sk; while, when s = 0, we have
|QK,| = |{v|v ∈ RK,, f (v) = K}| = |{v|f (v) = K}| = pt(n−1). (6)
• For any subset a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , s} and a = {1, 2, . . . , s}\a, let
S(, a) = {u ∈ GF(pt )s |∀i ∈ a, uji = ji and ∀i ∈ a, uji = ji }.
Notice that if a and b are different subsets, then S(, a) ∩ S(, b) = ∅. Moreover,
S(,∅) = {u ∈ GF(pt )s |u /
 } and S(, {1, 2, . . . , s}) = {}.
We can express
GF(pt )s =
⋃
a⊆{1,2,...,s}
S(, a).
At this point, we can start the real proof. Let us ﬁx K ∈ GF(pt ),  ∈ GF(pt )s, and a k-subset of indices  =
{j1, . . . , jk} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Let us consider the set
T(u, v) = {(u, v)|u ∈ GF(pt )s, v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}.
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The value
T =
∑
∈GF(pt )k
|T(u, v)|
=
∑
∈GF(pt )k
|{(u, v)|u ∈ GF(pt )k, v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}|
=
∑
∈GF(pt )k
∑
a⊆{1,2,...,k}
|{(u, v)|u ∈ S(, a), v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}|
=
∑
a⊆{1,2,...,k}
∑
∈GF(pt )k
|{(u, v)|u ∈ S(, a), v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}|.
We prove that f cannot be (n−k)-resilient by showing a contradiction on the value of T. First we compute the real value
of T and, then, the one that we would get if f were (n − k)-resilient. Since the two values are different, we conclude
that f cannot be (n − k)-resilient.
For any a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}, let
Ua =
∑
∈GF(pt )k
|{(u, v)|u ∈ S(, a), v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}|.
By ﬁxing an m-subset of indices a = {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}, we can partition
GF(pt )k =
⋃
∈GF(pt )k−m
{|[a] ∈ GF(pt )m, [a] = },
where [a] = (i1 , . . . , im) and [a] = (im+1 , . . . , ik ). Then,
Ua =
∑
∈GF(pt )k−m
∑
[a]∈GF(pt )m,[a]=
|{(u, v)|u ∈ S(, a), v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}|.
Let us ﬁx  ∈ GF(pt )k−m, and let
Wa() =
∑
[a]∈GF(pt )m,[a]=
|{(u, v)|u ∈ S(, a), v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}|.
Moreover, let  =⋃i∈a{ji}, and  = \. Denoting with y = x[], z = x[], and v = x[], we can re-write f (x) as
f (x) = f (x[], x[]) = f (x[], x[], x[]) = f (y, z, v).
Notice that, u =  implies y = [a] and z = [a]. Therefore, we can rewrite RK, and S(, a) as
RK, = {v ∈ GF(pt )n−k|f ([a], [a], v) = K},
S(, a) = {(y, z) ∈ GF(pt )k−m × GF(pt )m|y /
 [a].z = [a]}.
Using these expressions, we get
Wa() =
∑
[a]∈GF(pt )m,[a]=
|{(y, z, v)|(y, z) ∈ S(, a), v ∈ RK,, f (y, z, v) = K}|
=
∑
[a]∈GF(pt )m,[a]=
|{(y, z, v)|y /
 [a], y ∈ GF(pt )k−m, z = [a],
f ([a], [a], v) = K, f (y, z, v) = K}|
=
∑
[a]∈GF(pt )m
|{(y, z, v)|y /
 , y ∈ GF(pt )k−m, z = [a],
f (, [a], v) = K, f (y, z, v) = K}|
= |{(y, z, v)|y /
 , y ∈ GF(pt )k−m, f (, z, v) = K, f (y, z, v) = K}|.
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Since there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between v′ ∈ GF(pt )n−k+m and (z, v), we can treat v′ = (z, v).
Then,
Wa() = |{(y, v′)|y /
 , y ∈ GF(pt )k−m, f (, v′) = K, f (y, v′) = K}|
= |{(y, v′)|y /
 , y ∈ GF(pt )k−m, v′ ∈ RK,, f (y, v′) = K}|
= |QK,|.
From Eqs. (5) and (6), it follows that
Wa() = |QK,| =
{
(pt − 1)k−mpt(n−k+m−2) if k >m,
pt(n−1) if k = m.
Therefore, we have that
T =
∑
a⊆{1,...,k}
Ua
=
∑
a⊆{1,...,k}
∑
∈GF(pt )k−m
Wa()
=
∑
a⊆{1,...,k}
∑
∈GF(pt )k−m
|QK,|
=
∑
a⊂{1,...,k},a ={1,...,k}
∑
∈GF(pt )k−m
|QK,| +
∑
a={1,...,k}
∑
∈GF(pt )k−m
|QK,|
=
∑
a⊂{1,...,k},a ={1,...,k}
∑
∈GF(pt )k−m
(pt − 1)k−mpt(n−k+m−2) + pt(n−1)
=
∑
a⊂{1,...,k},a ={1,...,k}
pt(k−m)(pt − 1)k−mpt(n−k+m−2) + pt(n−1)
=
k−1∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(pt − 1)k−mpt(n−2) + pt(n−1)
=pt(n−2)
{
k−1∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(pt − 1)k−m + 1
}
− pt(n−2) + pt(n−1)
=pt(n−2)
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
1m(pt − 1)k−m − pt(n−2) + pt(n−1)
=pt(n−2)(1 + pt − 1)k − pt(n−2) + pt(n−1)
=pt(n+k−2) − pt(n−2) + pt(n−1). (7)
On the other hand, if f were (n − k)-resilient, for any ﬁxed v ∈ GF(pt )n−k , f (u, v) would be balanced; that is, for
each K ∈ GF(p)t , it would be equal to
|{(u, v)|u ∈ GF(pt )k, f (u, v) = K}| = pt(k−1).
228 P. D’Arco et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 154 (2006) 219–233
Since, from Theorem 5, |RK,| = pt(n−k−1), then for any K ∈ GF(pt ) and any  ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size k, we have that
|T(u, v)| = |{(u, v)|u ∈ GF(pt )k, v ∈ RK,, f (u, v) = K}|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
v∈RK,
{(u, v)|u ∈ GF(pt )k, f (u, v) = K}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
v∈RK,
|{(u, v)|u ∈ GF(pt )k, f (u, v) = K}|
= pt(n−k−1)pt(k−1)
= pt(n−2).
Therefore,
T =
∑
∈GF(pt )k
|T(u, v)|
=
∑
∈GF(pt )k
pt(n−2)
= ptkpt(n−2)
= pt(n+k−2), (8)
which clearly contradicts (7). Therefore, f cannot be (n − k)-resilient. 
At this point, we can state the main result of this section.
Theorem 10. A secret sharing scheme  deﬁned by f :GF(pt )n → GF(pt ) can be k-cheating-immune only if
k <n/2.
Proof. A k-resilient function is also s-resilient, for any 1s < k. This observation, together with Theorem 9 and
Corollary 8, implies the result. 
The above upper bound on the number of cheaters holds also for the case of strictly k-cheating-immune secret sharing.
Indeed, a strictly k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme allows the possibility that all k cheaters submit fake shares.
6. A construction for k-cheating-immune secret sharing
We present a construction for k-cheating-immune secret sharing applying the ideas of the construction given in [10].
Basically, we use a new function 	 as a building block for the scheme, instead of the function 
 described in [10]
(unfortunately, the function 
 proposed in [10] is not balanced, as the construction requires).
In the following, if 1 denotes the identity in GF(pt ), we indicate the sum of p/2 elements equal to 1 by b+p , and
the sum of p/2 elements equal to 1 by b−p . Therefore, for any a ∈ GF(pt )n, the term b+p a (b−p a, resp.) is the sum of
p/2 (p/2, resp.) elements equal to a. In order to show the properties of our new function, we need some results,
that we brieﬂy recall.
Deﬁnition 11 (Pieprzyk and Zhang [10]). A function h of degree two is said to have the property B(k) if, for any
 ∈ GF(pt )n, with 1HW()k, and for any , the function h(x− + + )− h(x− + ) is a non-constant afﬁne
function.
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The next lemma is used to prove that our function is balanced.
Lemma 12 (Pieprzyk and Zhang [10]). Suppose a function f of degree two on GF(pt )n does not have a non-zero
constant term; in other words, f (0, . . . , 0) = 0. Then, f is balanced if and only if there exists a non-zero vector
 ∈ GF(pt )n such that f (x + ) − f (x) is constant and f () = 0.
The function 	 we use in order to set up a k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme is deﬁned as follows:
Lemma 13. Let n 2k + 1, and let 	n,p : GF(pt )n → GF(pt ) be a function deﬁned by
	n,p = x1 +
n/2∑
i=1
{b−p x[2i−1](n)x[2i](n) + b+p x[2i](n)x[2i+1](n)}
+
{
b−p xnx1 + b+p x1x1 if n is odd,
0 otherwise,
where [i](n) denotes the integer j such that 1jn, and j ≡ i mod n. Then, (i) 	n,p is balanced, and (ii) 	n,p satisﬁes
the property B(k).
Proof. For any 2jn, by deﬁnition, 	n,p has p quadratic terms including xj , which consist of either b+p terms
x[j−1](n)xj and b−p terms xjx[j+1](n) , or b−p terms x[j−1](n)xj and b+p terms xjx[j+1](n) in 	n,p. Moreover, if n is even,
there exist p quadratic terms including x1, which consist of b+p terms xnx1 and b−p terms x1x2. Otherwise, there exist
p + b−p quadratic terms including x1, which consist of b−p terms xnx1, b−p terms x1x2, and b+p terms x1x1. Let g be a
function deﬁned as g = 	n,p − x1. Then, g can be re-written as
g =
n/2∑
i=1
x[2i](n){b−p x[2i−1](n) + b+p x[2i+1](n)} +
{
x1(b−p xn + b+p x1) if n is odd,
0 otherwise.
Let  = (1, . . . , 1), and assume n is odd. Since pe = 0 for any e ∈ GF(pt )n (p is the characteristic of the ﬁnite ﬁeld
GF(pt )), and there exist n/2p quadratic terms, then g() = 0. Moreover, for 2jn, xj appears in p quadratic
terms, while x1 appears in 2b−p quadratic terms with another term xk = x1, and in b+p terms of the form x1x1. Fi-
nally, since a term (x1 + 1)(x1 + 1) produces two single x1 terms, g(x + ) − g(x) produces 2p single x1 terms.
Therefore, it is easy to verify that g(x + ) − g(x) = 0. Hence, 	n,p(x + ) − 	n,p(x) = 1, and 	n,p() = 1. Us-
ing Lemma 12, we can conclude that 	n,p is balanced. When n is even, we can also show that 	n,p is balanced,
similarly.
To show that (ii) of the lemma holds, we can proceed as follows: let =(1, . . . , n) ∈ GF(pt )n be a cheating vector
such that HW()= , where 1k. Moreover, let , and let J = {j |j = 0, 1jn}. Then, |J | =HW()= .
Each quadratic term that includes xi consists of variables in {x[i−1](n) , xi, x[i+1](n)}. Let Xi = {[i − 1](n), i, [i + 1](n)}.
It can be easily seen that no quadratic term exists in 	n,p(x+ + + )−	n,p(x+ + ). Therefore, to show that 	n,p has
the property B(k), it is enough to show that there exists a linear term xi in 	n,p(x+ + +)−	n,p(x+ + ). To this aim
notice that, since n2k+1, there exists an i such thatXi∩J ={[i−1](n)}. Let i0 be such thatXi0 ∩J ={[i0−1](n)}.Then
[i0−1](n) = 0, and i0 =[i0+1](n) =0. Hence, in 	n,p(x+ ++)−	n,p(x+ +), either [i0−1](n)b+p xi0 or [i0−1](n)b−p xi0
is the only term which includes xi0 . Therefore, 	n,p(x
+
 +  + ) − 	n,p(x+ + ) includes a linear term xi0 , which
ensures that 	n,p has the property B(k). 
Example 6.1. We provide an example of a function 	n,p(x). Let n = 3, p = 3, and k = 1. Then, we have that b−p = 1
and b+p = 2. According to the above lemma, the function 	3,3: GF(3)3 → GF(3) is deﬁned as follows:
	3,3(x1, x2, x3) = x1 + x1x2 + 2x2x3 + x3x1 + 2x1x1.
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It is not difﬁcult to see that 	3,3 is balanced. Indeed, we have
x1 x2 x3 S x1 x2 x3 S x1 x2 x3 S
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 2
2 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 2 2
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
2 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 2
1 2 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 0
2 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
Notice that 	3,3(0, 0, 0) = 0 and, for  = (1, 1, 1), it holds that 	3,3(1, 1, 1) = 1. Moreover, simple algebra shows
that
	3,3(x1 + 1, x2 + 1, x3 + 1) − 	3,3(x1, x2, x3) = 1.
We can also easily check that 	3,3 has property B(1). Indeed, for each  ∈ GF(3)3, with HW() = 1, and for any
, we have that 	3,3(x− +  + ) − 	3,3(x− + ) is given by
  	3,3(x
−
 +  + ) − 	3,3(x− + )
(1,0,0) (0,0,0) x2 + x3
(1,0,0) (1,0,0) 1 + x2 + x3
(1,0,0) (2,0,0) 2 + x2 + x3
(0,1,0) (0,0,0) x1 + 2x3
(0,1,0) (0,1,0) x1 + 2x3
(0,1,0) (0,2,0) x1 + 2x3
(0,0,1) (0,0,0) x1 + 2x2
(0,0,1) (0,0,1) x1 + 2x2
(0,0,1) (0,0,2) x1 + 2x2
Therefore 	3,3 has property B(1).
According to the strategy deﬁned by Lemma 5 andTheorem 5 in [10], using 	n,p as a building block, we can construct
a k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme. More precisely, it is possible to show that the following lemma holds.
Lemma 14 (Pieprzyk and Zhang [10]). Let f1 and f2 be two functions deﬁned over GF(pt )n1 and GF(pt )n2 ,
respectively. Let f (x) = f1(y) + f2(z), where x = (y, z), and y ∈ GF(pt )n1 , z ∈ GF(pt )n2 . Then,
(1) f is balanced if f1 or f2 is balanced.
(2) f has the property B(k) if both f1 and f2 have the property B(k).
By setting 
2k+1 = 	2k+1,p, and using the above result, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 15 (Pieprzyk and Zhang [10]). Let 
4k+2(x1, . . . , x4k+2)=
2k+1(x1, . . . , x2k+1)+
2k+1(x2k+2, . . . , x4k+2).
Then, the function 
4k+2 is balanced and satisﬁes the property B(k).
Finally, a k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme can be realized as follows:
Theorem 16 (Pieprzyk and Zhang [10]). Let k and s be positive integers with sk + 1, and let n1, . . . , ns ∈ {4k + 1,
4k + 2}, such that n= n1 + · · ·+ ns. Let f (x) be a function deﬁned over GF(pt )n by f (x)= 
n1(x1)+ · · ·+ 
ns (xs),
where x= (x1, . . . , xs), and, for i=1, . . . , s, the value xi ∈ GF(pt )ni . If each 
ni is constructed according to Lemmas
13 or 15, and 
n1 , . . . , 
ns have mutually disjoint variables, then the secret sharing scheme with deﬁning function f (x)
is k-cheating-immune.
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Example 6.2. We give an example of an (11, 11) cheating-immune secret sharing scheme. Let k=1, s =2, and p=5.
Moreover, let us set, according to Theorem 16, n1 = 5 and n2 = 6. It follows that n = n1 + n2 = 11. Let us start by
constructing the functions 	5,5 and 	3,5. Since p = 5, we have that b−p = 2, and b+p = 3. Hence:
	5,5(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x1 + 2x1x2 + 3x2x3 + 2x3x4 + 3x4x5 + 2x5x1 + 3x1x1,
	3,5(x1, x2, x3) = x1 + 2x1x2 + 3x2x3 + 2x3x1 + 3x1x1.
Then, let us deﬁne the functions 
5(z1) and 
6(z2), where z1 = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) and z2 = (x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11),
as follows:

5(z1) = 	5,5(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5)
= x1 + 2x1x2 + 3x2x3 + 2x3x4 + 3x4x5 + 2x5x1 + 3x1x1,

6(z2) = 	3,5(x6, x7, x8) + 	3,5(x9, x10, x11)
= x6 + 2x6x7 + 3x7x8 + 2x8x6 + 3x6x6 + x9 + 2x9x10 + 3x10x11
+ 2x11x9 + 3x11x11.
The deﬁning function f (x) : GF(5)11 → GF(5) of the cheating-immune secret sharing scheme is given by
f (x) = 
5(z1) + 
6(z2),
where x = (z1, z2). By plugging in the above pieces, we get the explicit form
f (x) = f (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11)
= x1 + 2x1x2 + 3x2x3 + 2x3x4 + 3x4x5 + 2x5x1 + 3x1x1
+ x6 + 2x6x7 + 3x7x8 + 2x8x6 + 3x6x6
+ x9 + 2x9x10 + 3x10x11 + 2x11x9 + 3x11x11.
A construction for strictly k-cheating-immune secret sharing schemes, which basically generalizes the above one,
can be found in [10].
7. Ramp secret sharing schemes
The idea of a ramp secret sharing scheme has been introduced in [3]. More precisely, a ramp secret sharing scheme
((t1, t2, n)-RS, for short) is a protocol by means of which a dealer distributes a secret s among a set of n participantsP
in such a way that subsets ofP of size greater than or equal to t2 can reconstruct the value of s; no subset ofP of size
less than or equal to t1 can determine anything about the value of the secret; and a subset of size t1 < t < t2 can recover
some information about the secret [3]. Using the entropy function [8], the three properties of a (linear) (t1, t2, n)-RS
can be stated as follows. Assuming that A denotes both a subset of participants and the set of shares these participants
receive from the dealer to share a secret s ∈ S, and denoting the corresponding random variables in bold, it holds that
• Any subset of participants of size less than or equal to t1 has no information on the secret value: formally, for
each subset A ⊆ P of size |A| t1, H(S|A) = H(S).
• Any subset of participants of size t1 < |A|< t2 has some information on the secret value: formally, for each subset
A ⊆ P of size t1 < |A|< t2, H(S|A) = (|A| − t1)/(t2 − t1)H(S).
• Any subset of participants of size greater than t2 can compute the whole secret: formally, for each subset A ⊆ P
of size |A| t2, H(S|A) = 0.
It can be easily seen that the deﬁning function of a (t1, t2, n)-RS, where the secrets are chosen uniformly at random,
is t1-resilient. Applying the same arguments we have applied before, and using Theorem 9, we can show the following:
Theorem 17. A (t1, t2, n)-ramp secret sharing scheme  deﬁned by f :GF(pt )n → GF(pt ) can be k-cheating-
immune only if k <n − t1.
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8. Conclusions and open problems
We have studied some properties and constraints holding for cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. We have
shown that a perfect secret sharing scheme cannot be cheating-immune, and we have given an upper bound on the
number of tolerated cheaters in such schemes. Then, we have repaired an existing construction to realize cheating-
immune secret sharing schemes. Interesting open problems are secret sharing constructions for threshold and general
(ideal) access structures. Another interesting research line could be the generalization of the deﬁnition of cheating-
immunity: at the moment, it is implicitly assumed that the secrets are chosen by the dealer uniformly at random. If the
dealer chooses the secret according to a certain probability distribution on the space of secrets, we have to require that,
when the cheaters submit fake shares, the probability distribution that they infer over the set of possible true secrets
(once the incorrect secret has been reconstructed) must be the same as the one that the honest participants infer (i.e.,
there is no advantage for the cheaters compared to the honest users).
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Appendix A. Entropy function
This appendix brieﬂy recalls some elements of information theory. However, the reader is encouraged to consult [8]
for details.
Let X be a random variable taking values on a set X according to a probability distribution {PX(x)}x∈X. The entropy
of X, denoted by H(X), is deﬁned as
H(X) = −
∑
xX
PX(x) log PX(x),
where the logarithm is to the base 2. The entropy function satisﬁes the inequality
0H(X) log |X|,
where H(X) = 0 if and only if there exists x0 ∈ X such that Pr(X = x0) = 1; whereas, H(X) = log |X| if and only if
Pr(X = x) = 1/|X|, for all x ∈ X. The entropy of a random variable is usually interpreted as
• a measure of the equidistribution of the random variable
• a measure of the amount of information given on average by the random variable.
Given two random variables X and Y taking values on sets X and Y, respectively, according to the joint probability
distribution {PXY (x, y)}x∈X,y∈Y on their cartesian product, the conditional entropy H(X|Y) is deﬁned as
H(X|Y) = −
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
PY(y)PX|Y(x|y) log PX|Y(x|y).
It is easy to see that
H(X|Y)0,
with equality if and only if X is a function ofY. The conditional entropy is a measure of the amount of information that
X still has, given Y.
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